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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The court's decision represents a major step in the area of pri-
soner's rights beyond the fact that it provides an alternative federal
remedy to prisoners in certain special circumstances. 3 The import of
this case stems more from the fact that it hopefully portends94 a greater
judicial receptivity to the rapidly increasing use of section 1983 by
prisoners95 and thus helps guarantee their access to a federal tribunal to
protect their constitutional rights.
HABEAS CoRPus - EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
United States ex rel. Nelson v. Zelker
A deluge of habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners has
caused serious concern among members of the federal judicary. Some
argue that the writ which, historically, has been held in high esteem as
the primary safeguard against unconstitutional deprivations of liberty,96
that, on June 19, 1972, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407
U.S. 919 (1972). This is somewhat surprising considering the unanimous opinion in
Wilwording. Perhaps the Supreme Court, realizing the difficulties encountered by the
Second Circuit herein and the tenacity of the exhaustion requirement in this area (see
note 77 supra), will attempt to finally settle the question by affirming the Second Circuit's
decision. This is, of course, speculation but the fact remains that the granting of cer-
tiorari does muddy the waters somewhat at a time when they were finally clearing.
Evidence that the Second Circuit is delaying application of the Rodriguez doctrine is
found in Ray v. Fritz, No. 72-1455, (2d Cir. October 19, 1972), where the court stated:
We would thus remand without further ado were it not for the grant of cer-
tiorari by the Supreme Court in Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972),
decided by this court en bane sub nom. Rodriguez v. Mc Ginnis, 456 F.2d 79 (1972).
93 The specific holding here provides alternative modes of relief only to those prisoners
whose § 1983 actions are so timed that restoration of their good behavior time would
result in their release. This group then has the alternative remedies of habeas corpus
and § 1983.
94A significant limitation on the availability of § 1983 actions stems from the fact
that the section is not applicable where a specific federal remedy is available for the
right involved. See note 70 supra. After Wilwording and Rodriguez, the continued
viability of this restriction must be questioned. The exhaustion requirement for § 1983
also appears to be fading in light of the multitude of Supreme Court precedents holding
that exhaustion is not required. See note 91 supra. Elimination of these restrictions now
appears likely and would obviously permit freer use of § 1983 by prisoners. However, the
present situation within the Second Circuit remains in a state of flux pending Supreme
Court review of Rodriguez. Ray v. Fritz, No. 72-1455 (2d Cir. October 19, 1972).
9 5 1n 1966, 21 state prisoner civil rights suits were commenced within the Second
Circuit. By 1971, this number had increased to 585. 456 F.2d at 86.
96 The writ of habeas corpus is one of our greatest safeguards of liberty. As R. Sokol
says in A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS Cos'us (1965), "the function of the Great Writ
can be simply expressed. It is to test in a court of law the legality of restraints on a
person's liberty." Id. at 2. The power to grant a writ of federal habeas corpus is given
to the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals and the district courts by 28 US.C. § 2241
(1970). Thus, a state prisoner, even after conviction and an unsuccessful appeal through
the state court system, may raise issues of law and fact that can culminate in his dis-
charge from custody.
The section of the habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.) that applies to
state prisoners is 28 U.S.C. § 2254 which provides that the writ may be granted "only
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has become a vehicle for flooding the federal courts with frivolous
claims.97 The Second Circuit, in United States ex rel. Nelson v.
Zelker,'( denied a state prisoner's request for a writ of habeas corpus
on the basis of a rigid and technical application of the requirement that
state remedies be exhausted before application for relief is made to the
federal courts.99 The decision is a clear, albeit unauthorized, extension
of the recent Supreme Court ruling in Picard v. Connor0( which re-
quires that the federal claims "be fairly presented to the state [courts]."'u0
If the opinion is to be explained, it can only be on the ground that the
Second Circuit wishes to give notice that it intends to discourage those
claims.
On March 20, 1964, petitioner Alvin Nelson and his co-defendant,
Biggins, were convicted of felony murder'02 in Supreme Court, New
York County, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Prior to and during
the course of trial, Biggins made two confessions. In the first, he impli-
cated Nelson as responsible for the murder through a description of
an accomplice that roughly fit Nelson. During the trial, Biggins at-
tempted to plead guilty and to completely exonerate Nelson from any
complicity in the crime. Out of the presence of the jury, Biggins stated
on the ground that he [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States."
(7Suggestions for Lessening the Burden of Frivolous Applications, Address by
Walter L. Pope, Senior Circuit Judge, Conference of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Aug. 2,
1962, 33 F.R.D. 409. Judge Pope stated:
Anyone having any understanding of our system of criminal justice would, I
think, heartily approve and regard with pride the many procedural safeguards
furnished for the protection of the accused. I know of no judge who would for
a moment consider changing the spirit of our law which calls for these safe-
guards. Yet many of our judges are deeply disturbed about the fact that in
making these protections available to the presumably innocent defendant, we
have at the same time opened the door to a multitude of utterly frivolous ap-
plications, many of them actually fraudulent as well as frivolous, which serve
but to clog the dockets of the District Courts, and actually to lead to a feeling
of frustration and resentment on the part of all judges, both trial and appellate.
Id.
98465 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1972).
9 The requirement that a state prisoner exhaust state remedies is now expressly
contained in the habeas corpus statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) provides, inter alia:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective
to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he
has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.
100 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
'01 Id. at 275. See note 123 infra.
102 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044(2) (McKinney 1944).
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that it was he who fired the fatal shots and that he had been aided by
another accomplice, not Nelson. However, the prosecutor refused to
accept this plea and, when Nelson moved for a severance of his trial
so that he might call Biggins as a witness, the trial court denied the
motion. The earlier, inculpatory confession was subsequently intro-
duced into evidence.10 3
Nelson appealed his conviction through the state courts,104 chal-
lenging the trial court's refusal to sever as an abuse of discretion.10 5
He began this, his third, 06 habeas corpus petition, as a pro se action,
basing it on the same grounds and claiming that the alleged abuse
deprived him of a fair trial. The District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York rejected the petition on the merits and, on appeal,
Nelson's assigned counsel raised an additional objection, citing Brady v.
Maryland'0 7 as support for an argument that the prosecutor's refusal
to accept Biggins' plea was a deliberate suppression of exculpatory evi-
dence. The Second Circuit seized upon this new contention, declaring,
"[t]his focuses attention upon the alleged misconduct of the prosecutor
in a context certainly not considered by any state tribunal."'08
More significantly, however, the court devoted the greater part of
its reasoning to a finding that Nelson had also failed to exhaust state
remedies with respect to the abuse of discretion argument. The court
103 This confession later became the basis for a state appeal board by Biggins who
argued that it should have been excluded on the basis of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). (Miranda was decided after Biggins and Nelson were tried). The New
York Court of Appeals ordered a hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. People
v. Pitman (Biggins) & Nelson, 18 N.Y.2d 919, 223 N.E.2d 494, 276 N.YS.2d 1001 (1966).
104 People v. Pitman (Biggins) & Nelson, 25 App. Div. 2d 637, 268 N.Y.S.2d 83
(Ist Dep't 1966), aff'd as to Nelson, modified as to Biggins, 18 N.Y.2d 919, 223 N.E.2d 494,
276 N.YS.2d 1001 (1966).
105 Nelson also contended that he had been denied his constitutional right to defend
himself and had been deprived of a fair trial because of prejudicial conduct on the part
of the prosecutor. Those contentions were rejected by the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals and were summarily
treated by the Second Circuit on this appeal. 465 F.2d at 1122-23.
106 Nelson filed his first petition on November 30, 1967, alleging violations of his
rights to confrontation (since he could not cross-examine Biggins as to the confession
admitted into evidence) and to compulsory process (with respect to one of his subpoenaed
witnesses). After the petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, Nelson
sought state coram nobis relief. Denial of his application was unanimously affirmed
in People v. Nelson, 31 App. Div. 2d 601, 295 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1st Dep't 1968) (mem.).
Nelson filed his second petition for habeas corpus on March 29, 1969, alleging the same
issues which he raised in his first petition and in the coram nobis proceedings, i.e., sixth
and fourteenth amendment violations because of the admission of Biggins' confession
without opportunity for Nelson to cross-examine (the Bruton problem. See note 126 infra)
and because of the alleged denial of his right to compulsory process. The petition was
denied on the merits by the district court and affirmed in United States ex rel. Nelson v.
Follette, 430 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917 (1971).
107 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See notes 128 & 129 and accompanying text infra.
108465 F.2d at 1124.
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acknowledged that the argument had been litigated through the state
courts and found that "although couched in terms of an abuse of discre-
tion vested in the trial judge under section 391 of the former New
York Code of Criminal Procedure... it might be properly construed
as also raising the claim that the abuse resulted in a denial of due
process."' 10a Nevertheless, the Second Circuit opinion complained that
the argument "was muted in comparison with" another constitutional
claim raised by Nelson on appeal 10 and, therefore, under the holding
of Picard, the state courts never had "'a fair opportunity' to consider
the alleged constitutional defect.""'
The exhaustion of state remedies doctrine evolved from the 1886
case of Ex parte Royall." 2 There, the Supreme Court held that a
federal court should not intervene in a state criminal proceeding
in advance of trial and indicated that federal courts should likewise be
reluctant, in the absence of good cause shown, to consider petitions for
writs before state appellate proceedings are exhausted. The Supreme
Court reiterated the doctrine in subsequent cases" 3 and one decision,
Ex parte Hawk,114 served as the basis for codification of the exhaustion
requirement.115
The doctrine underwent a liberalization with Brown v. Allen,"6
decided in 1953. In Brown, the Court held that exhaustion requirements
109 Id.
110Id. (emphasis added). As support, the Second Circuit stated, "In fact, in his
first federal habeas corpus proceeding this [the Brutor argument. See note 106 supra and
note 126 infra] was the basis of the entire severance argument, with no mention at all of
the exculpatory confession as a basis for constitutional infirmity." 465 F.2d at 1124.
The court failed to explain what bearing contentions raised by Nelson in a federal
habeas corpus action had on the question whether he had provided state courts a fair
opportunity to consider the abuse of discretion argument.
111 465 F.2d at 1124, quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971).
112 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
113Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900). The Court stated that the federal writ
"should be confined to cases where the facts imperatively demand it." Id. at 402. See
also Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907).
114 321 U.S. 114 (1944). The Court said:
Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained under a state courtjudgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a federal court only
after all state remedies available, including all appellate remedies in the state
courts ... have been exhausted.
Id. at 116-17. See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
115 See note 99 supra.
no 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 859 U.S. 894 (1959) where a prisoner
who had appealed to the state's highest court on two grounds, one constitutional and
the other state, was held to have exhausted his state remedies since the state court's
opinion would be deemed based on the constitutional argument. For a liberal Second
Circuit dictum, see United States ex rel. Cuomo v. Foy, 257 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 935 (1959). See also McBee v. Bomar, 296 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1961), where
a prisoner who had appealed on a general abuse of discretion issue to the state courts
was held to have exhausted his state remedies.
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were met where a state prisoner's federal constitutional claim was de-
cided adversely by the state's highest court despite the prisoner's failure
to pursue a state collateral remedy that would have been based on the
same facts and issues and notwithstanding the fact that certiorari had
been denied with respect to the state appellate decision. Further liberali-
zation took place in Fay v. Noia"7 where a prisoner who had lost his
right to state appeal by a failure to timely file such an appeal was
deemed to have exhausted his state remedies. This trend climaxed in
Roberts v. LaVallee"8 where the Court held that a prisoner need not
resubmit to state courts a constitutional question the answer to which
is dictated by Supreme Court precedent." 9
The Court may have signaled its disinclination to continue in this
direction by its Picard decision but such a reading of the case would
still not justify the Second Circuit's reasoning in Nelson.
The Picard petitioner alleged in both his state appeal and federal
petition that he was brought to trial pursuant to a defective state indict-
ment in violation of his fifth amendment right to indictment by grand
jury. The district court dismissed 120 but the First Circuit reversed on
the ground that there was a denial of equal protection. 121 As the Su-
preme Court noted, the "equal protection issue entered [the] case only
because the Court of Appeals injected it.122 The Court went on to hold
117 372 U.S. 391 (1963). For an opposing view, see 48 VA. L. Ry. 761 (1962). The
author says, "the federal system requires that state court defendants not be allowed to
forego the available appellate procedures of the state and then seek relief in the federal
court." Id. at 765. For a similar view, see Kling v. LaVallee, 306 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1962).
118389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam). Accord, Coleman v. Maxwell, 351 F.2d 285 (6th
Cir. 1965); Saulsbury v. Green, 347 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1965).
However, courts have been reluctant to grant the federal writ in situations where
it would be based on factual allegations not presented to the state courts. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Brodie v. Herold, 349 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1965); Blair v. California, 340 F.2d
741 (9th Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 339 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1964);
Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d
1027 (lst Cir. 1970), where the validity of an arrest was first presented as an issue to the
federal court.
Recently, the exhaustion doctrine was strictly applied in Davis v. Dunbar, 394
F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1969), where petitioner advanced
two contentions not presented on appeal. See also Daniels v. Nelson, 453 F.2d 340 (9th
Cir. 1972); Lattimore v. Craven, 453 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1972).
119 In the Roberts case, the state's highest court, in the interim between the denial
of the prisoner's petition by a district court and his appeal to the circuit court, had
reversed itself with respect to the constitutional issue raised by petitioner and originally
decided against him. The court of appeals held that, since relief was now available
in the state courts, petitioner should return there but the Supreme Court reversed this
ruling.
120 Connor v. Picard, 308 F. Supp. 843 (D. Mass. 1970).
121 434 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1970).
122 404 U.S. at 277.
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that the claim raised in the state court must be "substantial[ly] equi-
valent"' 2 3 to that considered by the federal forum.
In Nelson, the Second Circuit readily conceded that petitioner
raised his due process arguments before both the federal and state tri-
bunals.124 However, the Court was not convinced that the rule of Picard
was satisfied. Instead, it utilized the Supreme Court's statement that
the state court must have "'a fair opportunity' "125 to consider the
constitutional claim and concluded that no such opportunity had been
presented since the exculpatory testimony argument had been "muted"
by the Bruton argument.126
Thus, the Second Circuit held, in effect, that in order to exhaust
state remedies under Picard, a petitioner must not only allege each
constitutional theory in detail but must also carefully balance the
arguments so that one cannot later be said to have obscured any other.
Whether this is the correct thrust of the Supreme Court's "substantial
equivalent" test is seriously open to question.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals sought to remove any "doubt
[which] might exist about" its holding27 by noting that Nelson failed
to allege in the state court that the prosecutor's deliberate suppression
of evidence was in violation of the doctrine of Brady v. Maryland.128
In Brady, the prosecution suppressed a statement by petitioner's co-
defendant who admitted the actual homicide. The Court held "that
123 Id. at 278. The Court admitted that identical facts were presented by petitioner
in both his state appeal and federal proceedings. Thus, Picard's substantial equivalency
test must be read as applying to constitutional theories as well as facts. The Court
heavily emphasized that petitioner's new equal protection claim could not be deemed
the substantial equivalent, or even a near relation, to his original argument seeking
to apply the fifth amendment's indictment by grand jury requirement to the states via
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
124465 F.2d at 1124.
1251d., quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 US. 270, 276 (1971).
126 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the prosecution introduced as
evidence a confession of defendant's alleged co-conspirator implicating him. Since the
confession was directly inculpatory and defendant could not cross-examine his co-
defendant, the Court held this to be a violation of the right to confrontation. Nelson
relied on Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), which held that Bruton must be applied
retroactively. The Second Circuit, in United States ex rel. Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d
1055 (2d Cir. 1970), ruled that the confession in Nelson was not the type of "clearly
inculpatory" or "'powerfully incriminating"' statement that Bruton had in mind nor
did it "form ... such a vital part of the Government's case against Nelson that. . . [it
was] bound to have a devastating effect on the minds of the jurors incurable by ap-
propriate cautionary instructions." Id. at 1058-59.
See, eg., United States v. Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1969); Slavek v. United States,
413 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lipowitz, 407 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1969).
These cases upheld convictions on the ground that defendants were not prejudiced by
confessions of their co-defendants.
127465 F.2d at 1124.
128 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon [defendant's] request violated due process...."-129
The failure to raise this alternative claim which would have
bolstered Nelson's due process argument can hardly justify the con-
clusion that the state court was not sufficiently apprised of the constitu-
tional claim. In fact, both the abuse of discretion and Brady claims
raised by Nelson are assertions of a denial of due process springing from
the same set of facts. Picard dealt with a situation where two distinctly
different theories, 130 i.e., due process and equal protection, were
advanced. It seems that Nelson's (or his counsel's) major error was his
lack of familiarity with the Brady case at the time of state appeal. Yet,
Picard states, "[W]e do not imply that respondent could have raised the
equal protection claim only by citing 'book and verse on the federal
constitution.' "131
Even if the claim presented by Nelson in the federal courts had
not been raised in the state courts, Picard did not repudiate criteria
established earlier in Fay v. Noia32 and Roberts v. La Vallee.as In Fay,
the Court held that a prisoner who was barred from state relief for failing
to file a timely appeal was deemed to have exhausted his state remedies
unless there was an intentional waiver of his state appellate rights.
Nelson's time limit for state appeal had elapsed prior to this appeal.
The precise allegations Nelson made can, therefore, no longer be as-
serted on appeal. 34 Under the Fay rule, unless Nelson intentionally
129 Id. at 87. The suppression doctrine was first developed in Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935), where the Court held that perjured testimony introduced by a
prosecutor violated the accused's rights. The Court said:
Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a
defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the
obtaining of a like result by intimidation.
Id. at 112.
The doctrine was extended in United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815
(3d Cir. 1952), where the court granted a habeas corpus petition when evidence tending
to show that a policeman, rather than the accused, fired the fatal shot was suppressed
by the prosecution. The doctrine was reaffirmed in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959), where a prosecutor failed to correct a state witness who testified falsely that
he had not negotiated with the prosecutor. See also Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607
(1960) (per curiam); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam) (prosecutor sup-
pressed evidence of a wife's infidelity that could have reduced a murder charge to
"murder without malice" under Texas law); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221
F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955) (a prosecutor suppressed evidence that defendant was drunk,
relevant to the culpability of his mental state).
130 But see 404 U.S. at 278-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 278 (majority opinion).
132 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
133 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam).
134 Under Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), Nelson does not have to pursue




waived his right to a state appeal, his claim should have been heard by
the federal court.
In Roberts v. La Vallee,135 the Court held that the "mere possi-
bility of a successful application to the state courts"' 36 would not bar
relief under the exhaustion doctrine. The Court stated that such a
stringent requirement would severely limit federal habeas corpus
petitions and concluded:
We can conceive of no reason why the State would wish to burden
its judicial calendar with a narrow issue the resolution of which
is predetermined by established federal principles. 187
The suppression issue presented by Nelson has been firmly established
as violative of due process in Brady and thus would seem clearly pre-
determined by federal law.
A rigid requirement of exhaustion of state remedies frustrates the
purpose of the federal writ of habeas corpus. The purpose of the federal
writ is to provide a prisoner with another civil review to safeguard his
federal rights.138 The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity and is
not a jurisdictional requirement. 39 The reasons for the doctrine are
sound: since the state remains the basic political unit in America, the
federal judiciary should not interfere with state court proceedings
without affording the courts a fair opportunity to correct their constitu-
tionally defective rulings; 40 moreover, the federal courts are simply
not equipped to handle the great volume of state appeals. 141 Such rea-
sons would not have been disturbed by a contrary holding in Nelson
while such a holding would have established that the exhaustion doc-
trine may not be wrongly used to avoid a decision on the merits. 42 A
135 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam).
130 Id. at 42-43, citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
137 Id. at 43.
138 See 17 Amx. L. RaE. 78 (1962-63). "Simply put, the manifest purpose of federal
habeas corpus is to insure a federal forum to hear alleged deprivations of constitutional
rights." Id. at 84.
139 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See R. SOKOL, supra note 96, at 113-14.
140 See 48 VA. L. REv. 761 (1962). The author says the situation "is part of a more
expansive problem of regulating the delicate balance in a constitutional federalism."
Id. at 764. But see 76 HAv. L. REv. 416, 417 (1962). See also Note, The Freedom Writ -
The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HAv. L. Rxv. 657 (1948).
141 The argument that the federal courts are not able to handle the number of ap-
peals that the state courts have is a cogent one. See 1963 DuKF L. J. 374, 376 (1963)
where the author speaks of the courts becoming "overwhelmed with petitions." See also
the argument presented by New York Appellate Division Justice James D. Hopkins in
Federal Habeas Corpus: Easing the Tension Between the State and Federal Courts, 44
ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 660, 666 (1970).
142 D. MEAfoR, PRLuns To GMEON (1967). Dean Meador says,
'lhe exhaustion doctrine provides the state with a procedural defense to habeas
corpus actions in federal courts .... It is one of these procedural aspects of the
1972]
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stringent exhaustion requirement permits only those serving lengthy
sentences to qualify for the federal writ. 43 A policy of rigid procedural
restraints on the writ seems unsound since it frustrates decisions on the
merits of at least some petitions that are, in fact, substantively meri-
torious. Such a policy, as Justice Douglas has noted, makes a "trap out
of the exhaustion doctrine which promises to exhaust the litigant and
his resources, not the remedies."' 44
SUFFICIENCY OF PROSECUTOR'S EVIDENCE
United States v. Taylor
The Supreme Court has observed "that proof of a criminal charge
beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required."' 45 While the
concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not synonymous with mathe-
matical certainty, 46 it is more exacting than the burden of proof re-
quired in civil actions, 147 with the distinction often expressed in terms
of probability of occurrence:
With respect to a normal issue in a civil case, one party loses if
the jury does not believe that existence of the fact is more
probable than its nonexistence .... With respect to a normal issue
in a criminal case, the state loses if the jury does not believe that
existence of the fact is so highly probable "as to dissipate all
reasonable doubt."' 48
case that can frustrate a decision on the merits. If the court wishes to avoid
deciding the constitutional issue, it will often be able to say that state remedies
have not yet been exhausted. On the other hand, if the court desires to make a
constitutional ruling, it is often just as easy for it to say that state remedies have
been sufficiently exhausted or that under the circumstances exhaustion will be
excused.
Id. at 21.
143 See Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Before Bringing Federal Habeas
Corpus: A Reappraisal of U.S. Code Section 2254, 43 NEB. L. REv. 120 (1963).
It evidently takes so long under the present requirements of Section 2254 to
mature a case for federal habeas corpus that the 'lighter' sentences of only a few
years are completed and the cases thereby become moot before they can even
receive a hearing.
Id. at 132.
144 Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 281 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
145 1n re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). This rule is so strong that the Court
applied it even to a juvenile proceeding where a 12-year-old was faced with confinement
for six years. The Court gave a concise history of the due process requirement that a
criminal conviction be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that the
standard is applicable to "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [one]
is charged." Id. at 364.
146 Holland v. United States, 348 US. 121, 138 (1954). "The government must still
prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt though not to a mathematical
certainty." Id.
147The standard of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence. See
PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 97 (9th ed. 1964).
148 McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden ol
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